

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 3988

X.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-79

TAGS: MARR, NATO, PO

SUBJECT: AZORES NEGOTIATIONS

REF: STATE 167333

SUMMARY.

WE BELIEVE BEST APPROACH TO IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING OF ENHANCED NATO ROLE OF AZORES LIES IN MAKING A CASE IN NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE AND THEN DPC ON MILITARY (SURVEILLANCE/ASW) GROUNDS, CITING EXPANDED SOVIET NAVAL THREAT. QUESTION OF A PORTUGUESE COMMAND POSITION COULD FOLLOW AND EVOLVE FROM MC RECOMMENDATIONS, AS ENDORSED BY DPC, FOR ENHANCED NATO ROLE OF THE AZORES. ALTHOUGH POSSIBLE POLITICAL OBJECTIONS BY SOME ALLIES TO LARGER PORTUGUESE ROLE ARE PROBABLY BEST HANDLED THROUGH MILITARY CASE APPROACH, FAILURE TO ACHIEVE DESIRED RESULT COULD EMPHASIZE BILATERAL CHARACTER OF PRESENT AZORES ARRANGEMENT AND ALSO ENCOURAGE PORTUGUESE TO DEMAND LARGER QUID. IF WASHINGTON CHOOSES TO FOLLOW SOMEWHAT TIME-CONSUMING MILITARY CASE APPROACH, IT MAY WISH TO OUTLINE OUR INTENTIONS TO PORTUGUESE EARLY IN CONFIDENTIAL

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NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. REFTEL INDICATES THAT PURSUANT TO U.S. OBJECTIVE OF RETAINING PEACETIME USE OF AZORES' FACILITIES WITHOUT QUID

PAYMENT TO PORTUGAL, U.S. IS CONSIDERING MOVES TO ENHANCE NATO ROLE OF AZORES, POSSIBLY INVOLVING A COMMAND POSITION FOR PORTUGAL.

2. AS TO ENHANCING NATO ROLE OF AZORES, WE BELIEVE BEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS LIES IN MAKING A CASE ON MILITARY GROUNDS IN NATO. WE SUGGEST:

(A) A U.S. INITIATIVE POSSIBLY ORIGINATED BY CINCLANT, DURING WHICH WE WOULD POINT TO THE SOVIET NAVAL THREAT IN THE ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN, WIDER SOVIET NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS, AND GROWING SOVIET SUBMARINE THREAT, PARTICULARLY THAT OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINES. WE WOULD CITE CONSEQUENT NEED FOR INCREASED SURVEILLANCE AND SUGGEST A MILITARY COMMITTEE STUDY LEADING TO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING SURVEILLANCE AND ASW FACILITIES IN THE ATLANTIC, SPECIFICALLY IN THE AZORES. THIS APPROACH SHOULD LEAD TO:

(B) AN MC REPORT TO THE DPC ALONG THE LINES OF OUR INITIATIVE. WE WOULD HOPE THAT DPC DISCUSSION OF THE MC REPORT AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS COULD BE IN TERMS OF MEETING THE MILITARY THREAT, WHICH ALL ALLIES RECOGNIZE.

2. AS WASHINGTON NOTES, CERTAIN NATO MEMBERS COULD BE EXPECTED TO RESIST FOR POLITICAL REASONS ANY ENHANCEMENT OF PORTUGAL'S ROLE IN NATO. THESE COUNTRIES ARE THE NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, DENMARK AND POSSIBLY, THE FRG, JUDGING FROM THE RECENTLY-EXPRESSED SPD SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE AND ATTACK UPON LISBON'S COLONIAL POLICY. THE UK POSITION WOULD ALSO BE AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION BUT WE HAVE NO GOOD BASIS FOR KNOWING WHAT HMG'S POSITION IN THIS IS LIKELY TO BE. HOWEVER, THE MILITARY CASE FOR ENHANCING NATO'S CAPABILITIES IN THE FACE OF THE INCREASED THREAT IN THE ATLANTIC WOULD BE HARD FOR THE NETHERLANDS, IN PARTICULAR, AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES, TO A LESSER EXTENT, TO IGNORE. ALSO, THOSE OPPOSED TO ENHANCING PORTUGAL'S ROLE IN NATO MIGHT BE INHIBITED FROM A

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FRONTAL ATTACK ON THE PROBLEM BY THE FACT THAT PORTUGAL IS A NATO ALLY (AS OPPOSED TO THE SITUATION OF SPAIN).

3. AS TO A COMMAND POSITION FOR PORTUGAL, WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT THIS QUESTION BE ALLOWED TO EVOLVE FROM AND FOLLOW THE MC REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE DPC DECISIONS. IF THE OBJECTIVE FACTS OF A NEW COMMAND OR ENHANCED FACILITIES POINTED TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A PORTUGUESE OFFICER IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR ANY ALLY TO OPPOSE SUCH AN APPOINTMENT. THIS IS TRUE FOR REASONS OF NATO COURTESY AND ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE REPRISALS IN KIND.

4. ASIDE FROM AN UNCERTAIN AND POSSIBLY NEGATIVE ALLIED

REACTION, WASHINGTON SHOULD BE AWARE OF TWO POTENTIAL
PITFALLS IN THIS APPROACH:

(A) IF WE TRY AND FAIL TO GET AN INCREASED NATO ROLE FOR
PORTUGAL THE RESULT WOULD BE TO EMPHASIZE THE BILATERAL
CHARACTER OF THE AZORES ARRANGEMENT, AND, PERHAPS MAKE IT
MORE DIFFICULT TO GET U.S. CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL FOR THE QUID.

(B) STRESSING THE ENHANCED IMPORTANCE OF THE AZORES IN
MILITARY TERMS COULD CAUSE THE PORTUGUESE TO INCREASE THEIR
DEMANDS FOR COMPENSATION.

5. AS TO THE SPECIFIC POSSIBILITIES LISTED IN REFTTEL, PARA 4,
THERE IS ALREADY INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING FOR CERTAIN COMMUNICATIONS
FACILITIES IN THE AZORES, AND THIS SHOULD FACILITATE APPROVAL OF
SUCH FUNDING FOR OTHER PROJECTS, DEPENDING UPON THE NATURE OF THE
PROJECT. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE MC SHOULD SUGGEST THE SPECIFIC MEASURES
TO ENHANCE SURVEILLANCE AND ASW CAPABILITIES IN THE AZORES, INCLUDING

THE MATTER OF ESTABLISHING NEW COMMANDS OR COMMAND BOUNDARIES, BUT
IN THE MC/THE U.S. COULD FAVOR PROPOSALS ALONG LINES OF SUB-PARAS
C AND D THAT WOULD IMPLY A HIGH-RANKING BILLET FOR A PORTUGUESE
OFFICER.

6. WHILE FAVORING A U.S. INITIATIVE TO OBTAIN A DPC-APPROVED
PAPER ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AZORES FACILITIES TO NATO, WE
SHOULD ALSO GUARD AGAINST ANY IMPLICATION THAT LAJES WAS BEING
TRANSFERRED FROM U.S. TO NATO CONTROL. SUCH A TRANSFER MIGHT BE
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INFERRED FROM CREATION OF A NEW NATO COMMAND OR EXTENSION OF
BOUNDARIES. THE LANGUAGE OF ANY NEW U.S.- PORTUGUESE AGREEMENT
SHOULD THEREFORE BE QUITE EXPLICIT ON THIS POINT.

7. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE APPROACH WE HAVE SUGGESTED WOULD TAKE
SOME TIME TO COMPLETE, CERTAINLY BEYOND THE TIME FOR BEGINNING
U.S. BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PORTUGUESE. HOWEVER, IF
WASHINGTON CHOSE TO FOLLOW THIS APPROACH, IT COULD LET THE
PORTUGUESE KNOW INFORMALLY THAT WE WILL BE SEEKING AN ENHANCED
NATO ROLE FOR PORTUGAL AND THE AZORES, AND THAT A COMMAND FOR
PORTUGAL MIGHT BE A CONSEQUENCE.
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